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Abstract   
 
Private-sector unionization rates have fallen precipitously in the United States over the past half 
century, from 25% in 1973 to only 7% in 2018. We take a skill-based approach to studying this 
decline, using data from the Current Population Survey combined with occupation-specific task 
requirements from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the Occupational Information 
Network. We find that for both men and women, private sector unionized jobs became higher-
skilled by requiring more non-routine, cognitive skills and fewer manual or routine skills. We 
further show that union, non-union skill differences have polarized, with unionized worker 
occupations becoming relatively more intensive in non-routine, cognitive skills and in 
manual/routine skills. These changes have been more pronounced for women than for men. Next, 
we decompose these skill changes into three parts: (1) changes in skills within an occupation, (2) 
changes in worker concentration across existing occupations, and (3) changes to the occupational 
mix from both entry and exit. Most of the skill changes we document are driven by the second 
two forces. The third part of the analysis estimates union wage premiums that account for 
changing skill mix. We find that accounting for skills has a small effect on the union wage 
premium and that the premium remains high at over 20% for both men and women. Finally, we 
show how this evidence can be reconciled with a model of skill-biased technological change that 
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One of the most dramatic trends in the US workforce over the past 50 years is the decline 
in private sector union coverage, from 25% in 1973 to only 7% in 2018. Concurrent with the 
downward trend in private sector unionization, the skill composition of the US workforce has 
shifted towards higher-skilled jobs that are less manual and routine and more cognitive/analytical 
(Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003). This “polarization” of skill 
demand has been a central component of the increase in inequality in the US (Farber et al. 2018). 
The large changes in union coverage and skill composition of the workforce have given rise to a 
literature that seeks to understand the nature of the decline in private sector unions, the 
underlying causes of the decline, and the resulting effects on inequality (Farber et al. 2018; Card, 
Lemieux, and Riddell 2020; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Card 2001). A consensus is yet to 
emerge from this research, which underscores the fact that we still have a limited understanding 
of why private sector unionization has declined, how different types of workers have been 
affected, and how these changes have influenced the union wage premium.  
This paper sheds new light on the causes and consequences of the decline in private 
sector unionization using a task-based approach. This approach was introduced by Autor, Levy, 
and Murnane (2003) to study the effect of computerization on labor demand, and we are the first 
to apply these insights to the analysis of labor unions. We combine data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) from 1973 through 2017 with data on occupational skills from the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DoT) and the Occupational Information Network (O*NET).  
These datasets allow us to track the skill composition of occupations over time and, for the first 
time in the literature, show how the skill composition of workers covered by private sector 
unions has changed. We focus on two main categories that aggregate the skill categories 
analyzed in the seminal work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003):  “non-routine, cognitive” and 
“routine or manual.”2 Throughout our analysis, we focus on private sector workers as the 
dramatic reduction in unionization over the past decades has been driven entirely by the private 
sector (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2020).  
                                                            
2 The “non-routine, cognitive” skill group is an additive combination of non-routine, cognitive/analytical and non-
routine, cognitive/interpersonal. The “routine or manual” skill group is an additive combination of routine, 
cognitive; routine, manual; and non-routine, manual.” We aggregate across groups to ease exposition, since results 





The first part of the paper presents descriptive trends in the skill composition of the 
unionized and non-unionized workforce, overall and by gender. These trends are of independent 
interest, as they provide new insight into how the overall decline in unionization interacts with 
changes in skill demand to alter the types of workers who are union members. Next, we conduct 
a decomposition that seeks to explain why skills of unionized jobs have changed over time. We 
decompose the changes into three parts: (1) changes in skills within an occupation, (2) changes 
in worker concentration across existing occupations, and (3) changes to the occupational mix 
from both entry and exit over time. Finally, we examine how changes to the skill mix of 
unionized and non-unionized occupations affect the measured union wage premium. Our paper is 
the first to explicitly consider how changes in skills affect this parameter. We do so by 
interacting union membership with each skill measure in a wage regression. The results not only 
show how unions influence the return to specific skills but also allow us to calculate the implied 
union wage premium that incorporates changes in the union-specific return to skill.  
Consistent with broader patterns of skill-biased technological change (SBTC), our 
descriptive analysis shows that there were large increases in the non-routine, cognitive skills of 
unionized jobs between 1973 and 2017. In addition, there were large declines in routine or 
manual skills of unionized occupations. This skill upgrading is consistent with the findings in 
Farber et al. (2018), who show evidence of increased educational attainment of private sector 
unionized workers over this period.   
We further present evidence of increased polarization of skills across union and non-
union workers. First, we find that the differences in non-routine, cognitive skill between union 
and non-union worker occupations declined, with unionized workers exhibiting faster growth 
than their non-unionized counterparts. Second, the gap in routine or manual skill demand 
increased: union workers are relatively more likely to be working in occupations that require 
these skills than non-union workers over time. These patterns provide evidence that the gap in 
more advanced cognitive skills between union and non-union occupations has narrowed or been 
eliminated, while the decline in manual/routinized skills has been less dramatic in the union 
relative to the non-union sector. The result is that unionized jobs have experienced increased 
relative skill demand both in terms of cognitive, analytic and routine/manual skills.  
Because of the large differences in occupational sorting by men and women combined 




estimates throughout the paper. Among men, we find similar but muted patterns relative to the 
pooled estimates. Changes in cognitive, analytical skill coverage of unionized workers are larger 
among women: the skill gap is completely eliminated by 2017. Routine and manual skills of 
unionized jobs also decline substantially, but they do so similarly across union and non-union 
sectors. While the gender-specific patterns in skill coverage by union and non-union workers 
generally align, the changes are much more pronounced among women.  
We next decompose the gender-specific changes in skills by union and non-union 
workers to examine the role of within-occupation changes in skills, changes due to the share of 
workers in each existing occupation, and changes to the mix of occupations through entry and 
exit. Among men, changes to the worker share of occupations and entry/exit are individually 
important and explain 83% of the change in non-routine, cognitive skills of unionized workers. 
Hence, the increased concentration of these skills among unionized workers can be explained by 
shifts in unionized labor towards occupations that require these skills as well as the introduction 
of new occupations that are skill-intensive along these dimensions and the destruction of 
occupations that are not. Within-occupation changes in skill requirements only explain 17% of 
the increase in non-routine, cognitive skills among unionized workers. For routine or manual 
skills, changes in worker shares across occupations and changes to entry/exit of occupations 
explain more than the total overall decline. These patterns are balanced with an increase within 
occupations of the need for routine or manual skill.   
Among women, 93% of the change in coverage of non-routine, cognitive skills can be 
explained by worker sorting across occupations and occupation entry/exit. All three explanations 
contribute to the large declines we document in routine or manual skill demand.  
In order to help explain our results, we present a simple Roy model that extends the 
model of Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) to include three new features. First, we allow 
unions to adjust wages for the average skill level of workers in a given bargaining unit. This 
feature of collective bargaining leads to the prediction that increases in the returns to skill will 
have only a minor effect on workers’ incentives to switch from a unionized to a non-unionized 
firm. As average wages increase in both sectors, only workers who experience an increase in the 
idiosyncratic component of their skill that is large enough to overcome search frictions will find 
it optimal to switch. Second, our model incorporates the cost of unionizing, which has increased 




worker protections. Third, we include the cost of de-unionizing through a union decertification 
election. We present evidence from National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) union certifications 
and decertifications over time that are consistent with these costs being non-trivial.  
The model highlights that skill-biased technological change is unlikely to cause the 
patterns we document through changes in the return to skill. Rather, SBTC shifts the demand for 
workers across occupations and leads to occupation creation and destruction. Workers shift 
towards higher-skilled occupations that are less likely to be unionized, and the new high-skilled 
occupations that enter are less likely to have workers that seek to unionize. Occupations that exit 
also are more heavily unionized. Increases in the cost of a successful unionization drive keep 
these previously non-unionized professions from becoming unionized. Hence, we argue the 
decline in unionization reflects changes in the occupation mix, entry of non-unionizing 
occupations that tend to be higher-skill, and exit of more unionized occupations that tend to be 
lower-skill, combined with the high cost of unionizing. This explanation stands in contrast to the 
more traditional argument that unionization declined because the return to skill increased, which 
reduced the return to unionizing. That only a small number of bargaining units decertify provides 
additional supporting evidence for our preferred interpretation of the evidence.   
 Our explanation for the relative skill coverage of unionized jobs assumes that unions are 
able to respond to changes in the return to average skill in the bargaining unit. Combined with 
changes in the skill coverage of unionized relative to non-unionized jobs, this has potentially 
importance implications for the union wage premium. We next examine directly how the return 
to average skill in occupations varies across union and non-union workers over time and how 
accounting directly for occupational skill demand affects the measured union wage premium.  
 Among both men and women, there is a sizable return to non-routine, cognitive skill in 
the unionized sector that is lower than the return in the non-union sector. This gap has been 
reduced substantially over time, such that the return to non-routine, cognitive skill is similar 
between the union and non-union sectors by the end of our analysis period. For men, the return 
to routine/manual skills is higher among unionized workers, and the gap has grown since the 
1990s. Women in unionized jobs experienced lower relative returns to routine/manual skills until 
the mid-1990s, at which point the gap was eliminated and then reversed. These changes have 
been most pronounced among professions in the top quartile of each skill category.   




as controls, and including interactions between skills and union status. Despite the large changes 
in skill coverage and the returns to skill that we present, accounting for skills in these models has 
little impact on the estimates.  Our results are consistent with prior research in showing a stable 
union wage premium over most of this time period of between 0.2 and 0.3 log points (Card, 
Lemieux, and Riddell 2020; Farber et al. 2018).  
This paper makes several important contributions to the literature. First, we provide novel 
evidence on how skills of unionized workers have changed over time and how these changes 
compare to non-unionized workers. The most related analysis is Farber et al. (2018), who use 
Gallup Poll data back to the mid-1930s and show that union density is inversely proportional to 
worker educational attainment. Our results align with theirs but provide a more comprehensive 
picture of how the specific skill coverage of unionized workers has changed and how these 
changes compare to non-unionized workers. Farber et al. (2018) also do not decompose the 
changes in the educational attainment of unionized workers, which provides important insight 
into why the skill demand of unionized jobs has changed.  
Second, we present novel evidence that unionized workers experience a large return to 
skill that has grown over time relative to the non-union sector. We show the first evidence that 
unions use their bargaining power to increase the return to average skill in an occupation, which 
is consistent with unions negotiating to increase the wages of the median worker in a bargaining 
unit. Furthermore, our results provide new evidence on the stability of the union premium over 
time and the effect of accounting directly for occupational skill demand in these models.  
Third, our results help reconcile an unsolved puzzle in the literature: unionized workers 
have become more high-skilled (Farber et al. 2018), but models of skill-biased technological 
change predict that high-skilled workers will become less unionized over time because they are 
the beneficiaries of wage dispersion (Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante 2001). Our results show 
that these two arguments are not at odds. Unions cover more high-skilled workers over time 
because labor demand has shifted to higher-skilled professions. These professions do not “de-
unionize,” but heavily-unionized professions with lower-skilled workers become smaller and/or 
disappear. Hence, SBTC can explain the reductions in unionization and the changes in skill 
coverage of unionized workers, but it operates through changes to the occupation mix rather than 
through changes to the return to skill.  




composition of the workforce. In their seminal paper, Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) 
conducted the first such analysis to examine how computerization affects the skill content of 
different occupations. Since then, much work has been done that has taken a “task-based” 
approach to understanding changes in labor markets.3 We are the first to use this framework and 
these data to examine the skill content of union versus non-union jobs, which we argue allows us 
to break new ground in understanding why private sector unionization declined and the 
implications of this decline for workers.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review 
focusing on what is known about the decline in private sector unionization and the union wage 
premium. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion on the data we use in the analysis. Section 4 
presents trends in skill coverage of private sector union jobs as well as the decomposition of 
those changes into cross-occupation shifts, within-occupation changes, and changes in the 
composition of occupations themselves. The estimation of union wage premiums that account for 
the skill content of jobs is presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides a discussion and conclusion.  
  
2. Background 
2.1. The Decline in Private Sector Unionization 
Private sector unionization has declined precipitously since the 1970s, from 
approximately 25% in 1973 to 6% in 2017. The drop in private sector unionization was 
particularly pronounced among men, from 30% to 8% over this time period, while for women 
the decline was more modest, from 14% to 5%.  The reduction in private sector union coverage 
was largest in the early 1970s-mid 1980s, and thereafter there has been a more gradual but 
persistent decrease. The decline in unionization is isolated to the private sector: in the public 
sector unionization rates actually increased over the same time period, from 23% in 1970 to 34% 
in 2017.4 Private sector collective bargaining rules are set by the NLRB, while states set public 
sector bargaining laws for non-Federal employees. The fact that public sector union coverage is 
so much higher reflects the fact that most states have worker-friendly union laws that have 
resulted in high and stable unionization rates for teachers, firefighters, and police officers 
(Frandsen 2016).  
                                                            
3 See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a review of this literature.  




There currently is little understanding about why private sector unionization rates have 
declined so dramatically. One of the most prominent arguments is that the decline is driven by 
skill-biased technological change. Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) present a model of 
unionization under SBTC that is predominantly based on the idea that unions transfer wages 
from high-skilled to low-skilled labor. When there is SBTC, unionization declines for two 
reasons: 1) the outside option of incumbent higher-skilled workers increases and 2) new workers 
obtain more education to take advantage of higher wages and then sort into non-unionized firms. 
The underlying assumption of this model is that unions compress the wage structure, which 
makes unionized jobs increasingly less attractive for high-skilled workers.5 Furthermore, as 
higher-skilled workers exit unionization, there are fewer rents to redistribute to lower-skilled 
workers and the union premium declines.  
While the Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) model is compelling along a number 
of dimensions and provides clear predictions, there are a number of aspects of the collective 
bargaining environment that are not accounted for. Most importantly, the authors model 
collective bargaining as a firm level decision rather than as a bargaining unit level decision. 
Bargaining units are more narrowly defined than firms and either are occupation-specific or 
group similar occupations together. Large firms usually have multiple bargaining units, even if 
the bargaining units themselves all are represented by the same union. In such an environment, 
what matters most for workers is the skill variance within the bargaining unit. To take an 
extreme case, if all workers are identical within a bargaining unit, SBTC should not reduce the 
incentives to unionize because unions can negotiate wages for all employees that reflect the 
market value of their skill. If unions set wages based on the median skill of workers in the 
bargaining unit, increases in the return to skill driven by SBTC will not lead to much reduction in 
unionization.  
The Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) model predicts that SBTC will lead to a 
reduction in high-skilled employees being covered by a union, which is at odds with existing 
evidence. Farber et al. (2018) construct a new dataset on union membership from Gallup Polls 
back to the 1930s that include questions on union membership. They combine these data with the 
                                                            
5 Acikgoz and Kaymak (2014) build on this model to show that SBTC will lead skilled workers to leave firms, 
which reduces the productivity of low-skilled workers. As a result, firms will be less willing to pay union rates for 




CPS to generate the longest historical micro data series of its kind on union membership in the 
US, and they show that the educational attainment of private sector union members has grown 
substantially over time. Additionally, as union coverage declines, the union wage premium is 
unchanged, which contradicts the theoretical predictions of Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante 
(2001). While Farber et al. (2018) document this inconsistency, they do not adduce a model that 
can resolve it. We address this puzzle directly in this paper.   
Farber et al. (2018) focus on educational attainment as their worker skill measure. This is 
a noisy measure of skill, however, because skill is likely to be multi-dimensional. Our skill-based 
approach allows us to examine in more detail how the skill composition of union jobs has 
changed over time, which yields key insights into how and why unionization has declined. We 
highlight a second dimension of SBTC that has received little prior attention in the union 
literature: skill-biased technological change alters the composition of the economy, which is 
reflected by changes to the demand for different existing occupations and the entry/exit of 
occupations. Farber and Western (2001) show that the change in employment rates between the 
union and non-union sectors can explain all of the private sector unionization decline between 
1973 and 1998. Outside of Farber and Western, this aspect of SBTC has not been included in 
prior models or in prior empirical work examining the decline in private sector unionization, and 
we show that sorting across occupations as well as entry/exit of occupations are of first-order 
importance when seeking to understand the change in the skill coverage of union jobs. In sum, 
we argue that a task-based approach to studying the decline in unions provides important new 
information on why private sector unionization has declined and points to some key revisions to 
the Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) model that allow us to align theoretical predictions 
and empirical results.  
2.2. Union Wage Premium 
There is a rich literature studying the wage effect of unionization. Lewis (1986) and 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) provide early estimates from the heyday of private sector unions in 
the 1960s and 1970s.6 These papers use micro data on workers and estimate regression models 
that rely on selection-on-observables methods for accounting for endogenous selection into 
unionization. A large set of studies has emerged since that time, using similar methods on 
                                                            




updated data to estimate the union wage premium. Most recently, Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 
(2020) estimate union wage premiums over several decades using CPS data. They find that the 
male and female wage premiums remained quite stable from 1973 to 2015 at about 0.2 log points 
(22%). Farber et al. (2018) find similarly-stable estimates of 0.2 log points over this period. 
These estimates align closely with those in Freeman and Medoff (1984).7  
DiNardo and Lee (2004) take a different approach from the rest of the literature by 
estimating regression discontinuity models surrounding union representation elections. By 
comparing outcomes of elections in which the bargaining unit barely won to outcomes of 
elections in which the bargaining unit barely lost, they find no effect on wages. Importantly, this 
approach only identifies wage effects among unions that barely won an election, which might be 
a different effect from those that win more handily if vote share is related to underlying 
bargaining power.  
While estimates of the union wage premium are relatively well established, none of the 
prior papers in the literature consider the skill content of the jobs covered by unions. With 
declining unionization and changes in the occupations covered by unions, it is surprising that the 
premium has remained constant over time. We are the first to directly embed job-based skill 
measures into the estimation of union wage premia, which are potentially important because as 
we show the task content of union jobs has changed considerably over time. Accounting for 
these factors allows us to more accurately identify the union wage premium for both men and 
women than has been possible in the prior literature. 
3. Data 
Data on worker characteristics and wages come from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) May supplement for the years 1973-1981 and from the Current Population Survey 
Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) sample for the years 1983-2017.8 While the ORG survey 
replaced the May CPS as the primary data source for wage and employment information 
beginning in 1979, the May CPS continued to ask union membership questions through the early 
1980s. The ORG surveys began asking union membership questions only in 1983. Consistent 
                                                            
7 Much research also has examined the effect of unions on inequality (e.g., DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; 
Card 2001; Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 2018; Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2020; Farber et al. 2018). These papers 
generally find that deunionization contributes importantly to wage inequality.   




with prior work, we focus on union membership status rather than union coverage to maintain 
comparability over time and across survey designs (Card 2001; Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 
2020).9 We omit 1982 from our analysis because the question on union membership was not 
asked in the CPS that year. 
Our analysis sample is restricted to private sector workers with positive earnings who are 
not self-employed. We measure hourly wages directly for those paid hourly; for workers not paid 
hourly, we calculate hourly wages by dividing usual weekly earnings by weekly hours worked. 
Consistent with prior literature, we correct for changes in top coded earnings over ORG surveys 
by multiplying these earnings by a factor of 1.5 (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Autor, 
Manning, and Smith 2016; Hirsch and Schumacher 2004). We also correct for inconsistencies in 
the CPS in questions about educational attainment before and after 1992 and create a time-
consistent measure of years of schooling (Card 2001; Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2020).10 We 
standardize wage values to 2016 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) 
index. Finally, like prior work (Card 1996; Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2020), we drop workers 
whose wage calculations rely on allocated earnings data. Omitting these workers is important 
because the allocated earnings in the ORG supplement are based on a “hot deck” procedure, 
which imputes missing wages based on a set of worker characteristics matched to workers with 
non-missing wage data (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004; Caplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012). 
Because union status was not a factor used in this procedure, estimates of the union wage 
premium have been shown to be biased downward when relying on allocated data (Hirsch and 
Schumacher 2004).11  
To obtain a time consistent definition of the occupations, we crosswalk all Census 
occupation codes to their 1990 equivalent based primarily on the method proposed by Acemoglu 
and Autor (2011) and the harmonized occupation codes at the IPUMS USA repository (Ruggles, 
et al. 2019). We match the remaining occupations by hand using occupation descriptions 
                                                            
9 In particular, the 1973-1976 CPS did not ask a union coverage question, but only asked a union membership 
question. 
10There was a change in the way educational attainment was coded between the 1991 and 1992 surveys from highest 
grade completed to a measure of highest degree achieved. We recode post-1992 values to their pre-1992 years of 
schooling counterparts for consistency. 
11Dropping those with allocated earnings reduces our total sample size of men by just under 25% and our sample of 
women by 20%. These are in line with the allocation rates of 26.5% for union workers and 25.7% for nonunion 




available from the Census. Some occupations do not have a clear 1990 equivalent, either because 
the occupation no longer exists in meaningful numbers (e.g. telegraph operators), or because an 
occupation first enters the CPS in a later year. Our decomposition analysis accounts for these 
changes to occupation coverage in the data.12 
To identify the relevant skills and tasks of each occupation, we use the metrics of 
occupation characteristics in the 1977 and 1991 editions of the Dictionary of Occupation Titles 
(DOT) survey as well as the 2004 and 2017 editions of the Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET) survey. Both surveys are fielded by the US Department of Labor. In each survey year, 
workers and occupation-specific experts are asked about the knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
tasks associated with each occupation. The DOT data are based on 1990 Census occupation 
codes and come from Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).  The O*NET data are collected at the 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code level, which is a designation that is finer than 
Census occupation codes. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we create a weighted average 
of each skill rating in 1990 Census occupation code equivalents. This is done by weighting the 
O*NET data in each SOC code by total employment from the BLS Occupational Employment 
Statistics (OES) data for 2003-2017.  
Our main measures of occupational skill are aligned with those in Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane (2003). We begin with five skill measures: non-routine, cognitive analytical; non-
routine, cognitive interpersonal; routine manual; routine cognitive; and non-routine manual. A 
core impediment to using the O*NET and DOT data is that the skill measures are different in the 
two datasets. We construct harmonized skill measures across the two datasets by matching 
information in the DOT data to the 2004 and 2017 O*NET data. This procedure involves 
locating a direct match or constructing an index across similar measures if a direct match cannot 
be found. We convert O*NET skill ratings into a single index by taking the mean across each 
measure.   
“GED – math” is the measure of non-routine, cognitive, analytical skill in DOT that 
corresponds to “math” ability in the O*NET data. “Direction, control, planning” in DOT 
corresponds to “organizing, planning, and prioritizing work” in O*NET and represents non-
                                                            
12 In 1983, the CPS incorporated 1980 Census occupation codes, which expanded the set of occupations assigned a 
separate code relative to the 1970 definitions. While this change mechanically increases the share of skill changes 
attributed to entry/exit when including pre-1983 years, our results are qualitatively similar and our conclusions are 




routine, cognitive, interpersonal skills.  The DOT measure of routine, cognitive tasks, "set limits, 
tolerance, or standards,” corresponds to a combined index in the O*NET that incorporates 
“controlling machines and processes,” “drafting, laying out, and specifying technical devices, 
parts, and equipment,” and “troubleshooting.” As our measure of routine, manual work, “finger 
dexterity,” is a simple conceptualization that is common across the DOT and O*NET data. 
Finally, for non-routine, manual skills, “eye, hand, and foot coordination” in the DOT 
corresponds to our constructed index in O*NET that combines “gross body equilibrium” and 
“spatial orientation.” To address different scales in the DOT and O*NET datasets, we 
standardize each measure to be mean zero with a standard deviation of one in each year across 
1990 occupations. Appendix Table A-1 shows each DOT measure we use and its O*NET 
equivalent(s). 
To reduce dimensionality and facilitate exposition, we further collapse the skills 
categories into two groups: “non-routine, cognitive” is the sum of non-routine, 
cognitive/analytical and non-routine, cognitive/interpersonal, while “routine or manual” is the 
sum of routine, cognitive; routine, manual; and non-routine, manual. The descriptive patterns of 
the disaggregated skills within each of the aggregated groups are similar to one another, so we 
lose little information by aggregating. The Online Appendix presents our results using the more 
disaggregated skill categories. 
In total, our analysis sample consists of 3.4 million workers during the 1973-2017 period. 
Summary statistics for our sample are shown separately for men and women and by union 
membership status in Table 1. Workers who are members of a union are older, slightly less 
educated, make about 0.2 to 0.3 log points more per hour, and have wages that are less dispersed, 
relative to the average non-union worker. Importantly, union workers are in occupations that are 
significantly more routine or manual in nature and that require less non-routine, cognitive skills 
than their non-union counterparts.  
Table 2 presents the five largest unionized occupations in 1973 and in 2017 for men as 
well as their union membership rate and the skill level among the five skills we consider. In both  
1973 and 2017, the five largest unionized occupations require substantial routine or manual skills 
and require less non-routine, cognitive skills. Unionization rates are very high in these 
professions in 1973, at between 47 and 64%. By 2017, the unionized share of even the most 




change, the occupations accounting for the largest share of unionized workers continue to be 
heavily routinized and manual. 
Table 3 presents similar information for women. It is important to note that there is no 
overlap in either time period between the five largest unionized occupations for men and women. 
This finding supports examining men and women separately, because they sort into very 
different occupations. As with men, the largest unionized occupations in 1973 are quite different 
from those in 2017, and there is a large decline in the unionization rate across all occupations 
listed. The most substantive difference between men and women is in the skill requirements of 
unionized professions over time: in 1973 the professions contributing most to the overall 
unionization rate are heavily routinized and manual, but particularly among women there is a 
substantial shift to jobs that require cognitive and non-routine skill (e.g., nursing and teaching) 
by 2017. We show below that this pattern is evident across a broader set of occupations. 
Finally, we show the five occupations with the highest unionization rate among the top 
quartile of each skill category, separately for 1973 and 2017, in Table 4. For each skill, there are 
substantial changes in which occupations are the most unionized over time. These differences are 
driven by some combination of changes in the number of unionized workers within occupations, 
changes in the occupation mix, and within occupation changes in skill requirements. Our 
decomposition exercise below is designed to shed light on the empirical relevance of each of 
these forces in driving the overall changes in the skill composition of union membership.  
  
4. Trends in Skill Coverage of Private Sector Union Workers 
4.1. Trends in Skills of Private-Sector Unionized Workers 
Figure 1 presents trends in each normalized skill measure for unionized and non-
unionized private sector workers by year from 1973 to 2017. Each panel shows means of a 
specific skill by year and union status (left y-axis) as well as the trend in the overall private-
sector unionization rate (right y-axis) to facilitate mapping of changes in skills of unionized work 
with changes in private sector union membership.  
The top panel shows patterns for non-routine, cognitive skill.13 The coverage of this skill 
among unionized workers increased substantially, from -0.591 in 1973 to -0.041 in 2017. This 
                                                            
13 Online Appendix Figure A-4 shows patterns for the five disaggregated skill categories that comprise the two skill 




0.550 standard deviation increase is most pronounced during the 1990-2005 period. As overall 
unionization rates declined, unions increasingly covered occupations that had higher skill 
requirements along this dimension. This can be seen most prominently in Figure 2, where we 
split the sample into occupations in the top and bottom quartile of each skill measure in 1991 and 
show trends in union coverage for each group.14 The top panel of Figure 2 demonstrates that the 
increase in non-routine, cognitive skill is coming from a large decline in union coverage in jobs 
with low levels of this skill. The union coverage in the bottom quartile declines from 33.6% in 
1973 to 8.1% in 2017. The reduction in unionization among high non-routine, cognitive jobs is 
much smaller, from 8.2% in 1973 to 5.3% in 2017. Hence, the increase in this skill concentration 
among unionized workers is coming predominantly from a substantial reduction in the union 
coverage of low-skilled jobs for this skill measure. As the figure demonstrates, the time pattern 
of this reduction matches the change in overall union coverage very closely. Figures 1 and 2 
demonstrate that the non-routine, cognitive skill content of unionized jobs has grown 
substantially over time, which mostly is driven by reduced unionization of workers in 
occupations that have low non-routine, cognitive skill requirements.  
Routine or manual skills among unionized jobs have declined markedly, as shown in the 
bottom panel of Figure 1. The overall change is 0.460 standard deviations, going from 0.503 in 
1973 to 0.043 in 2017. These declines are mostly driven by routine, manual and routine, 
cognitive skills (See Online Appendix Figure A-4).  Figure 2 shows that the decline in union 
coverage was most pronounced for occupations requiring high levels of this skill.  
It is instructive to compare the changes in skill coverage among unionized workers to 
those among non-unionized workers. Figure 1 includes these comparisons. For non-routine, 
cognitive skills there is convergence between the union and non-union sectors. Non-union jobs 
have higher levels of this skill requirement, but the gap declines over time from 0.283 in 1973 to 
0.182 in 2017 (a 0.10 standard deviation decline, or a 35.5% reduction). Thus, not only are 
unionized workers increasingly in jobs that require high levels of non-routine, cognitive skills, 
the skill increases they experience are large relative to the non-unionized sector.  
Unionized workers are in occupations that have more routine or manual skill 
requirements. This is expected, as private sector unions traditionally covered workers in more 
routinized and manual professions. As the demand for such work has declined, however, the 
                                                            




routinized/manual skill gap between non-union and union workers has grown. The difference 
increased from -0.414 to -0.534 – a 29.1% increase from the initial difference.  
Taken together, the evidence from Figure 1 points to increased stratification of skills 
across the union and non-union sectors. Unionized workers are increasingly working in jobs that 
require higher levels of non-routine, cognitive skills. This increase is occurring overall and 
relative to the non-union sector. However, relative to non-unionized workers, unionized workers 
are also increasingly working in occupations that require manual or routinized skills. The 
coverage of these skills has declined over time in both sectors, but it has done so more steeply 
for non-unionized workers. To the extent that these skills are valued in the labor market, these 
changes in skill coverage could influence the union wage premium. Prior research has not 
addressed this changing skill content of unionized and non-unionized work, and Figure 1 
suggests these changes may be important in accurately identifying how and why the union wage 
premium has moved over time. We examine this question directly below.  
Because of large differences in union coverage and occupational sorting by gender, we 
now turn to an examination of changes in skill content of unionized jobs separately for men and 
women. Figure 3 shows trends in standardized skill measures by gender and union status.15 
Among unionized men, there has been a sizable increase in non-routine, cognitive skill 
requirements of their jobs of 0.422 standard deviations, from -0.567 to -0.145. This is much 
larger than the increase in this skill category among non-unionized workers (0.296).16 The gap 
between union and non-union skills hence declined by 0.125 standard deviations. The manual or 
routine skill measure declined among unionized men by 0.182 standard deviations. This was 
smaller than the 0.257 standard deviation decline among non-unionized men, resulting in an 
increase in this skill difference of 0.076 standard deviations among unionized relative to non-
unionized men. As with the overall pattern, there is clear increased stratification of skills across 
male union and non-union worker occupations, with relative increases in both skill groups.  
Changes for women are larger than among men, which highlights the importance of 
examining this under-analyzed group in the private sector union literature.17 Non-routine, 
                                                            
15 Online Appendix Figure A-6 presents analogous results for the five disaggregated skill groups.  
16 Online Appendix Figure A-1 presents trends in each occupational skill for men by union and non-union status on 
the same figure (identical to Figure 1) to facilitate comparisons across union and non-union workers. Online 
Appendix Figure A-2 presents the same information for women.  
17 With the exception of Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2020), all of the prior literature on the private sector union 




cognitive skills increase by 0.830 standard deviations among unionized workers, while the 
change among non-unionized workers is 0.618. The pre-existing skills gaps across union and 
non-union workers thus declined by 0.212 standard deviations. The decline in routine or manual 
skill requirements of unionized jobs was particularly pronounced among women, dropping by 
0.921 standard deviations. As Figure 3 shows, as of the early 2000s, unionized work among 
women required relatively more non-routine, cognitive skill than routine or manual skill. We do 
not observe a similar crossing among unionized men. The decline in routine or manual skill for 
unionized women was similar to what non-union female workers experienced, such that there 
was little relative change across sectors in routine or manual job requirements. Hence, the 
relative increase in manual/routine skills among unionized workers is concentrated among men.  
Because of differences in how skill coverage of unionized and non-unionized workers 
varies by gender, driven in part by differences in how men and women sort into occupations, we 
examine men and women separately in the remainder of the paper. Pooled estimates are available 
from the authors upon request.  
4.2. Decomposition of Skill Changes 
The results discussed above show that the skill composition of occupations and workers 
covered by unions has changed considerably over time. Unionized work has shifted to include 
more non-routine, cognitive skills and less manual or routine skill. At the same time, there has 
been a polarization in skills across union and non-union workers. These results raise a central 
question: why has unionized work changed in this way? Any explanation of why private sector 
unionization has declined must also explain why the coverage of skills has shifted in the ways we 
document.  
As a first step in understanding why unionization has declined in the manner shown in 
Section 4.1, we decompose the change in each skill coverage over time into three parts: (1) the 
part due to changes in the unionized worker share in existing occupation, (2) the part due to 
changes in skill requirements within existing occupations, and (3) the part due to entry and exit 
of occupations themselves. This decomposition yields new insight into the causes of the private 
sector union decline that cannot be identified without taking a task-based approach.  
Let Skt be the standardized skill measure of occupation k in year t, and ω  be the share of 
all unionized workers in that occupation and year (ω
∑




unionized workers in the occupation and year). Define 𝜏  as the share of unionized labor in 
occupations in 2017 that span 1973-2017 and 𝜏  as share of unionized labor in occupations in 
1973 that span 1973-2017. It is helpful to partition occupations (k) into three groups: 
 k1 – occupations that exist in both 1973 and 2017 
 k2 – occupations that exist in 1973 but not in 2017 
 k3 – occupations that exist in 2017 but not in 1973. 






. The average skill 
level of skill S among unionized workers can then be written as follows:  
𝑆̅ 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 𝜏   𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 1 𝜏                  1  
𝑆̅ 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 𝜏   𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 1 𝜏                  2  
 
We can decompose the change in each skill among unionized workers into the three constituent 
parts:  
𝑆̅ 𝑆̅  𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 𝜏   𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 1 𝜏  
 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 𝜏   𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 1 𝜏
𝜏 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔
 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 𝜏 𝜏  𝑆 ∗ 𝜔
∗ 1 𝜏   𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 1 𝜏 .                                      3  
 




𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔
𝑆 ∗ 𝜔  
 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 𝜔 𝜔 ∗ 𝑆 𝑆                           4  
Plugging (4) into (3) yields the full decomposition:  
𝑆̅ 𝑆̅  𝜏 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 𝜔 𝜔 ∗ 𝑆 𝑆   
 𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 𝜏 𝜏  𝑆 ∗ 𝜔
∗ 1 𝜏   𝑆 ∗ 𝜔 ∗ 1 𝜏                                     5  
 
The first term in curly brackets in equation (5) shows the change in skill coverage among union 
workers due to changes in worker sorting across existing occupations between 2017 and 1973. This 
part of the decomposition shows us how much of the observed change in skills among unionized 
workers between 1973 and 2017 is due only to changes in the concentration of workers across 
existing occupations. That is, it shows us what union coverage of skill S in 2017 would have been if 
unionized workers were distributed across existing occupations as in 1973. Note that this 
decomposition only includes unionized workers. If declining unionization affects all occupations 
equally, there will be no change in worker share. The worker share only will change if there are 
changes in worker concentration across unionized professions. 
The second term in curly brackets in equation (5) shows the change in skill S due to shifts in 
skill requirements within occupations. This part of the decomposition shows how much of the change 
in each skill is due to changes in the occupation itself. If unionized occupations are changing skill 
requirements differently than non-unionized occupations, it could drive some of the relative changes 
we present in Section 4.1. An alternative interpretation of the second term in equation (5) is that it 
shows what the average skill level would have been in 2017 had the skill requirements of 




The last three terms in equation (5) show the effect of occupational entry and exit on the skill 
content of unionized jobs. Entry and exit are important to consider, especially because we focus on a 
long time period over which there was much technological change. This led to the creation of many 
new occupations and the elimination of many older obsolete occupations. Since new occupations, 
particularly high-skilled ones, may be less likely to unionize, this part of the decomposition provides 
direct evidence on the role of skill-biased technological change in driving changes in the skill content 
of unionized jobs.  
Results of this decomposition are shown in Table 5.18 Panel A presents results for men 
and Panel B shows results for women. In each panel, each column is a separate decomposition. 
We show the part of the change that is due to each component as well as the percent of the 
overall change due to each component in brackets. For example, non-routine, cognitive skill 
increased by 0.422 standard deviations among men between 1973 and 2017. The part due to 
changes across existing occupations is 0.141 standard deviations, which is 33.30% of the total, 
while 0.208 standard deviations (49.39%) is due to changes in the occupational mix from entry 
and exit. Together, these two components explain 82.69% of the total change in this skill 
coverage. The remaining 17.31% is explained by within-occupation changes in skill 
requirements.   
The change due to worker share and due to entry/exit of occupations each explains over 
100% of the total change in the coverage of this skill. The within-occupation change, however, 
moves in the opposite direction. But for the fact that unionized professions have become more 
manual and routine, the decline in routine or manual skills of unionized jobs would have 
declined even more. These findings highlight the importance of examining each of these forces 
separately to paint a more complete picture of how unionized work has changed over time. 
Taken together, the results in Panel A of Table 5 show that most of the changes to the skill 
composition of male unionized jobs are due to shifts in the composition of workers across 
existing occupations and occupation entry/exit.  
Online Appendix Tables A-2 and A-3 shows decompositions for changes in skill 
coverage from 1973-1990 and 1990-2017, respectively.19 This sub-period analysis is informative 
                                                            
18 Decompositions for each of the five disaggregated skill groups are presented in Online Appendix Table A-5. The 
results are similar to those in Table 5.  
19 Note that the sub-period decompositions do not sum to the overall decomposition estimates because we allow the 





because the rise of computers and information technology such as the Internet occurred largely 
after 1990. The results in each sub-period generally align with overall decomposition estimates, 
with one notable difference: the within-occupation routine/manual skill change is negative and 
sizable in the early period and is positive in the later period. It also is the case that changes due to 
occupational entry/exit explain a relatively larger share of the non-routine, cognitive skill 
increase between 1973 and 1990, while changes in worker share across occupations is relatively 
more important in the later period.  
Panel B of Tables 2, A-2 and A-3 show decomposition results for women. Non-routine, 
cognitive skill increases by 0.830 standard deviations, which, similar to men, is driven mostly by 
changes in worker shares across occupations and by occupational entry/exit. However, changes 
to worker share is relatively more important in explaining changes among women, while for men 
occupation entry/exit is more important. All three explanations are relevant for explaining the 
decline in routine or manual skill. The sub-period analyses show a similar pattern in Appendix 
Tables A-2 and A-3. While changes in skill coverage are larger post-1990 than pre-1990, the 
changes in each period are driven by shifts in workers across occupations and occupational 
entry/exit.  
Sub-period decompositions in Online Appendix Tables A-2 and A-3 tell a somewhat 
similar story as the overall decompositions. In the early period, within-occupation changes are 
important for explaining the decline in routine or manual skill, while changes due to worker 
shares are less important. In the later period, occupation entry/exit has less explanatory power for 
both skill groups, and within-occupation shifts in skill requirements take on more importance. 
The sub-period decompositions continue to show the importance of worker shifts across 
occupations and occupation entry/exit, however they also suggest a somewhat larger role for 
within-occupation changes as well.  
Finally, to study the sources of the changes in union-non-union skill differences, Online 
Appendix Table A-4 shows similar decompositions for non-unionized workers. Interestingly, the 
decompositions show key differences between the sources of changes in the union and non-union 
sectors. Among men, changes in worker share explain none of the increase in non-routine, 
cognitive skills, which suggests that this is a key source of the narrowing of the gap in this skill 
between union and non-union jobs. For routine or manual skill, there is little role for within-




cognitive decomposition results are similar among women for union and non-union workers, 
while the results for routine or manual show a large role for within-occupation changes in 
explaining the decline in this skill requirement among non-unionized women.  
  
4.3. A Model of Return to Skill and Unionization 
The findings from Section 4.1 demonstrate that unionized jobs have become higher-
skilled in terms of non-routine cognitive skills for both men and women. In addition, male 
unionized workers are in positions that require slightly more manual or routine skills, while 
unionized women are in occupations that require less routine or manual skills. Our 
decompositions in Section 4.2 demonstrate that changes in both workers share and occupational 
entry/exit have produced large increases in non-routine, cognitive skill coverage and declines in 
manual and routine skill coverage for both genders. Within-occupation skill changes often 
obscure these broader patterns in manual or routine skill prevalence, however, especially for 
men.  
As discussed above, these findings are inconsistent with the existing model of SBTC and 
unionization because it predicts unionized workers should become less skilled over time 
(Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante 2001). This leads to an important question of what type of 
model can produce the patterns we document.20   
Three features of the unionized environment lend themselves to an extension of the 
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) model that we argue can explain our results. The first is 
the fact that negotiations are done by bargaining units, which can be quite homogenous.21 This is 
an important distinction from prior models of union behavior because with homogenous 
bargaining units, skill-biased technological change, or any increase in the return to skill, will not 
necessarily reduce the incentive to unionize. Unions may reduce the within-occupation variance 
in wages, but they can do so without reducing (or even increasing) the cross-occupation variance. 
If unions bargain by raising the wages of the median worker in the bargaining unit, increases to 
skill requirements of unionized jobs should lead to higher pay. Indeed, if there is employer 
                                                            
20 Farber et al. (2018) also discuss the fact that their findings are in contradiction to the predictions from Acemoglu, 
Aghion, and Violante (2001), however they do not pose a different model that can explain their results.  
21 Online Appendix Figure A-3 shows the size of bargaining units over time from certification elections. Prior to 
1998 the average bargaining unit was 65-70 employees, while after 1998 it dropped to under 40. Workers are likely 




market power, higher-skilled workers should want to unionize into relatively homogenous 
bargaining units because the union can better extract monopsony rents from the firm than can 
any single employee.  
Second, there are large frictions associated with de-unionizing. Workers can vote to 
decertify a union and cease collective negotiations, but such decertification elections are rare. 
Figure 4 shows trends in certification and decertification elections from 1962-2009, which we 
obtained from publicly-available National Labor Relations Board data. In the top panel that 
shows certification elections, it is clear that unions continue to win elections. Although there was 
a sharp decline in the prevalence of elections after 1982 due to policies of the Reagan 
administration that made it more difficult to organize, new certification elections were still 
common at over 3,000 per year. Further, the fraction of new certification elections won each year 
has remained relatively constant throughout the time period considered. The bottom panel shows 
similar tabulations for decertification elections. Decertification elections are much rarer, and 
only about 100 bargaining units win such elections each year. Figure 4 shows clearly that the net 
inflow of newly-unionized bargaining units is an order of magnitude larger than the outflow of 
workers who no longer collectively bargain.22 Holding the distribution of workers across 
occupations fixed, Figure 4 shows that there would be a persistent increase in private sector 
union coverage over time.  
The third feature also is shown in Figure 4: the barriers to organization have increased 
over time, especially since the 1980s. President Reagan’s fight against the air traffic controllers’ 
union combined with changes to the composition of the NLRB to be more business-friendly led 
to a much less favorable unionization environment in which employers can more easily fight a 
unionization effort (Kleiner 2001; Farber and Western 2001). As a result, the barriers to 
collective bargaining entry for new occupations is high, which likely dissuades many of these 
workers from engaging in organization efforts.  
We present a Roy model that is an extension of Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) 
which accounts for these additional features. Our model illustrates how skill-biased technological 
change is consistent with relative increases in the coverage of skilled occupations and a lack of 
                                                            
22 Dickens and Leonard (1985) present similar evidence that decertification elections cannot explain the decline in 




de-unionization. We model firms as collections of workers in different occupations, and each of 
these occupations can be unionized with its own bargaining unit.23 Each occupation has a skill 
requirement, So that does not vary across unionized and non-unionized firms. Hence, unionized 
and non-unionized jobs within the same occupation do not differ in terms of the skills needed to 
do those jobs but rather in the wage returns to those skills. Let skill S for worker i in occupation 
o be given by:   
                                                                  𝑆 𝑆 𝜂  ,                                                             (6) 
where 𝜂  is an individual-specific component of skill distributed 𝑁 0, 𝜎 . That is, each 
occupation has a skill requirement, and workers on average have skills that match the skill 
requirement of the occupation in which they work. There also is idiosyncratic worker skill that is 
distributed symmetrically about the mean skill requirement. The variance of the worker-specific 
component of skill is given by 𝜎  and is assumed to be exogenously given but can differ across 
occupations. 
Wages of individual i in occupation o and in firm f are determined by: 
                                              𝑊 𝛾 𝑆 𝛽 𝜂 ,                                                      (7) 
where 𝛾 shows the return to average skill and 𝛽 is the return to individual idiosyncratic skill. The 
skill returns are bargaining unit (i.e., firm and occupation) specific. A non-unionized firm only 
cares about the worker's overall skill level, given by 𝑆 𝜂  and thus will set 𝛾 𝛽. Unions 
typically attempt to raise average pay but compress the wage structure. In the extreme, they will 
set 𝛽 0  and will set a bargaining unit specific wage of 𝛾𝑆 . 
We further posit three sources of frictions in the model. The first is job switching costs, ?̅?. 
This cost can come from the existence of firm-specific training costs or from job search costs. 
Furthermore, there are costs of unionizing 𝑢  and de-unionizing ?̅? . The cost of unionization 
comes from the time, effort, and potential friction with one's employer that characterizes any 
organizing drive. They also include the frictions associated with negotiating the contract with the 
employer. De-unionization costs come from the fact that the decision to hold a decertification 
election is likely to be controversial and to take substantial time and effort on the part of 
organizers, which makes it costly to hold and win such an election. The large gap between 
                                                            
23 In practice, unions can cover multiple occupations within each bargaining unit. However, it is straightforward to 
negotiate salaries for different occupations within the same bargaining unit, so we simplify the setup by assuming 




decertification elections held and won shown in Figure 4 highlights the uncertainty associated 
with a decertification drive as well.  
Skill-biased technological change can be modeled by a change in the return to skill 
parameters (𝛽 and 𝛾). For simplicity, we will consider what happens when 𝛽 and 𝛾 change by 
the same amount. This is akin to a general increase in the return to skill. The first goal of the 
model is to characterize under what conditions skill-biased technological change will cause high-
skilled unionized workers to leave unionized firms and join non-unionized firms. We hold 
occupation fixed, so we assume workers shift across firms but not occupations. Consider two 
firms, the first of which is unionized for occupation o (denoted U) while the second firm is not 
unionized for that occupation (denoted N). Wages in each firm are given by: 
                                    𝑊 𝛾 𝑆 𝛽 𝜂                                                                   (8) 
                                    𝑊 𝛾 𝑆 𝛽 𝜂 𝛽 𝑆 𝜂                                        (9) 
The last equality of equation (9) comes from the assumption that in non-unionized environments, 
𝛽 𝛾. Workers will switch from U to N when 𝑊 ?̅? 𝑊 . Plugging in the terms from 
equations (8) and (9) and rearranging, we get the following incentive compatibility constraint: 
                                 ?̅? 𝑆 𝛾 𝛾 𝜂 𝛽 𝛽                                            (10) 
Equation (10) highlights that a worker will not switch from a unionized to a non-
unionized job if the switching cost is high relative to the net benefit of switching. In turn, the net 
benefit of switching is driven by differences in the return to average skill and differences in the 
return to idiosyncratic skill. If in the limit unions eliminate wage dispersion within the 
bargaining unit, equation (10) reduces to ?̅? 𝑆 𝛾 𝛾 𝜂 𝛽 . In general, we expect 
𝛽 𝛽  because unions reduce within bargaining unit wage dispersion, while we expect 
𝛾 𝛾  due to the existence of a non-zero union wage premium.  
The predictions of this model align with the patterns described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.24 
First, consider what happens when 𝛽 and 𝛾 increase by the same amount. The net return to 
occupational skill So does not change across firms, but non-union sector workers experience an 
increase relative to their unionized counterparts because 𝛽 𝛽 . If the variance of 𝜂 is small 
relative to the cost of switching jobs, few workers are induced to switch to the non-union sector 
                                                            
24 There likely are other models that also produce these predictions, although none have been presented in prior 
work. Our goal is to provide a simple Roy Model framework to understand the patterns we present in the data. We 
do not argue that this is the only model that aligns with our results. A more thorough theoretical analysis is an 




even though that sector becomes more attractive. With perfectly homogenous workers within 
occupations, changes in the return to skill will not have any effect on firm (and thus union) 
choice. 
The prior literature on unions indicates a sizable union wage premium on the order of 0.2 
log points. That is, 𝛾 is about 20% higher than 𝛾 . That unionized workers are paid more on 
average than are non-unionized workers in the same occupation means that the variance in 
individual skill must be quite large for a non-negligible subset of workers to find it worthwhile to 
switch to the non-union sector. Only those with idiosyncratic skill levels sufficiently high to 
overcome the 20% average wage difference and the switching costs will want to switch to a non-
unionized firm. As long as the skill variance is not very large within each occupation, SBTC 
itself will not cause an unraveling of unionization. 
We can conduct a similar exercise to show the conditions under which a non-unionized 
firm will unionize. Workers in a non-union firm will vote to unionize when their wage will 
increase in the union relative to the non-union environment sufficiently to offset any 
unionization costs. Assuming that workers are paid their marginal product or that unions are able 
to successfully extract monopsony rents from firms, increases in the return to skill for the median 
worker in a firm and occupation will be reflected in 𝛾. This follows from the assumption that 𝜂 is 
mean zero. Hence, with a non-zero cost of unionization (𝑢 , increases in the return to skill from 
SBTC will not alter the incentive for the median worker to unionize.  We argue it therefore is 
unlikely that wage dispersion associated with SBTC is a core driver of reductions in the number 
of new certification elections. Rather, as discussed above, 𝑢 has increased since the 1980s as the 
political environment has become more hostile to unions. 
Finally, will SBTC lead unionized bargaining units to decertify? Following a similar 
argument to the one presented above, as long as unions pay the median worker in a bargaining 
unit at least her marginal product, and if the cost of decertification (?̅?  is non-zero, increasing 
returns to skill will not cause the median worker to vote for decertification. Our simple model 
thus can explain why decertifications are not rising substantially despite large reductions in the 
unionization rate.  
This model underscores that changes in the returns to skill from SBTC are unlikely to 
cause the changing skill patterns and the overall reduction in the unionization rate we document. 




require non-routine, cognitive skills (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Deming 2017). The latter 
occupations have lower unionization rates; the shift to less-unionized occupations is reflected in 
the “change due to worker share” component of the decomposition results in Table 6. 
Furthermore, many highly-unionized occupations that were prominent in the 1970s no longer 
exist, and many new occupations have arisen that tend to require advanced skills. The “Change 
due to Occupation Entry/Exit” estimates in Table 6 argue for a central role of this mechanism as 
well. In both cases, our model indicates that the new or pre-existing non-unionized occupations 
do not unionize because the costs of unionization have risen over time.  
A main assumption of our model is that unions are able to negotiate wages that reflect the 
returns to the average skill level in the bargaining unit. As long as unions can negotiate wages 
such that the return to this average skill is similar to what non-union workers experience, 
changes to the return to skill will not have a large effect on unionization decisions. Put 
differently, it is the return to average skill rather than the dispersion of skills in a firm-occupation 
that drive unionization decisions. Whether unions generate a return to average skill and the 
resulting effect of these skill returns combined with changes in the skill coverage of unions has 
not been documented in prior research. We now turn to such an analysis to provide new evidence 
on these questions.  
 
5. Private Sector Union Wage Premium 
5.1. Empirical Approach 
What effect has the changes to union skill coverage had on the union wage premium? 
Several recent papers show that the returns to unionization have remained stable over the past 40 
years (Farber et al. 2018; Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2020). This is a surprising finding, 
especially in light of the above analysis which demonstrates that the skills covered by unionized 
workers have changed considerably. Most importantly, they have changed relative to non-union 
workers. In this section, we examine the implications of these changes for the union wage 
premium.  
The traditional model used to estimate the wage returns to unionization is a simple log-
linear regression model that relies on selection-on-observables (Freeman and Medoff 1984): 
                               𝐿𝑛 𝑤 𝛽 𝛽 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝛾𝑋 𝜙 𝜖 ,                                     (11) 




worker is a member of (or is covered by) a union, Xi is a vector of observed characteristics, and 
𝜙  are year fixed effects. These models are usually estimated using repeated cross-section micro 
data, such as the CPS, which contains only sparse worker observables such as age, race, gender, 
and educational attainment.  
 We estimate expanded versions of equation (11) in which we directly account for skills in 
two different ways. First, we simply control for each skill level in each occupation (c) and year: 
Sct. Specifically, we estimate models of the following form:  
              𝐿𝑛 𝑤 𝛽 𝛽 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∑ 𝜙 𝑆  𝛾𝑋 𝜙 𝜃 𝜖 ,              (12) 
In equation (12), the 𝑆  terms act as controls for skill, essentially treating skills as a previously-
unobserved confounder in equation (11). We also include in equation (12) occupation fixed 
effects. These fixed effects are rarely included in union wage regressions, but if workers sort into 
occupations based on unobserved aspects of productivity, occupation effects and union effects 
can be confounded. Furthermore, occupation fixed effects capture much of the variation in job 
skills that could be important if there is measurement error in the skill measures we use or if 
there are other dimensions of skill that we cannot capture with our data. To facilitate 
comparisons with prior work, we show estimates both with and without occupation fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level throughout the analysis.  
In equation (12), the union wage premium, 𝛽 , is net of the skills included in each 
occupation. These skills may be an important component of the union wage premium, however. 
In our final model, we include skill-union interactions that incorporate this effect in the estimated 
union wage premium:  
𝐿𝑛 𝑤 𝛽 𝛽 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝜙 𝑆 𝜏 𝑆 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝛾𝑋 𝜙 𝜃 𝜖 .       13  
The union wage premium in equation (13) is given by 𝛽 ∑ 𝜏 𝑆̅. This summation term 
incorporates any differential returns to each skill that is granted to unionized workers that does 
not apply to non-unionized workers. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta Method.  
5.2. Results 
Figure 5 presents estimates of the union wage premium for our three models by year. 
Panel (a) presents results for men while panel (b) shows estimates for women. All of these 




Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2020), we find that the union wage premium has remained 
relatively stable over time when one compares the early 70s to 2017. However, there is evidence 
for men and women that the union wage premium has fallen since its peak in the mid-1980s: the 
union wage premium from the “basic” model declines by about 11 percentage points for both 
men and women from 1985 to 2017.  
For men, we find that failing to account for skills has led to an understatement of the 
union wage premium of about 2 percentage points up until the early 2000s, after which the bias 
from ignoring skills is positive but is very small. The result of this difference is that the fall in the 
union wage premium since the mid-1980s is larger, at about 15 percentage points. Accounting 
for skills has a negligible effect on the wage premium among women, with the wage-inclusive 
estimates falling within 1 percentage point of the more traditional model estimate in most years. 
Interestingly, across genders, the models that control for job skill and that include skills in the 
union wage premium estimate are nearly identical. Hence, the specific way in which we control 
for job skill requirements does not matter.25  
Table 6 presents estimates for select years in each decade as well as standard errors. For 
men, the traditional estimates without fixed effects or skill controls shows a union wage 
premium of between 24 and 35 percent. Once we include skill controls, the estimates increase by 
4-6 percentage points prior to the 2000s and thereafter are slightly lower than the skill-exclusive 
estimates. Hence, ignoring occupational fixed effects and incorporating skills into the regression 
shows a stronger pattern of declining wage returns to unionization. When we control for 
occupation fixed effects, the estimates become somewhat larger and exhibit a similar time 
pattern. As with the estimates in Figure 5, these results indicate that the union wage premium is 
still high but has declined since the early 2000s.  
Panel B shows results for women. Similar to the results for men, the inclusion of 
occupation fixed effects increases the estimates, but the difference is much smaller, at 1-2 
percentage points. Adding in skill measures further increases the wage premium, which in all 
models declines by about 11-13 percentage points from the peak in 1985. The results and 
conclusions are unchanged when controlling for occupation fixed effects.  
                                                            
25 Online Appendix Figure A-7 shows union wage premium estimates that incorporate the five disaggregated skill 
groups. The estimates for men are nearly identical to those in Figure 5, while for women the skill-inclusive union 
wage premium is slightly higher in all years than the skill-exclusive premium. Union premium estimates for select 




The effect of accounting for the skills of unionized jobs on the union wage premium 
depends both on changes in the skills covered by unionized jobs over time as well as changes in 
the returns to those skills across the union and non-union sectors. As discussed in Section 4.3, 
the ability of unions to alter the return to average skill has important implications for the role of 
technological change in driving declines in unionization rates. Figure 6 presents the first 
estimates in the literature on how these different components of the union wage premium are 
changing over time for men.26 The solid and dashed lines shows the same changes in each skill 
presented in Online Appendix Figure A-1 and discussed in Section 4.1. The open circles and 
squares show the coefficients on the skill measure and the skill measure interacted with union, 
respectively, in the wage regression. The interpretation of these parameters is the return to a 
standard deviation in each skill level for union and non-union workers.  
For non-routine, cognitive skill, the return to skill among unionized jobs declines in the 
1990s both in an absolute terms and relative to the return in non-union jobs. Beginning in the 
early 2000s, the returns to this skill increase substantially and by the end of our sample period 
union and non-union workers experience similar return to non-routine, cognitive skill.  
That the returns to this skill is high and has increased relative to the non-union sector over the 
past two decades underscores the point that skill-biased technological change has not necessarily 
reduced the incentive for skilled workers to unionize.  
The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows similar estimates for routine or manual skill. The 
return to these skills are positive and similar for union and non-union workers until the 1990s, at 
which point the returns drop for non-unionized relative to unionized workers. As a result, by the 
mid-2000s the return to manual/routine skill is substantially higher in the union sector.27 
Figure 7 allows for non-linearity in the returns to skill by allowing the returns to vary by 
quartile of the non-routine, cognitive skill level. The top panel shows estimates for non-
unionized workers, while the bottom panel shows results for unionized workers. There is a clear 
non-linearity in both sectors, with the returns to skill being highest among the highest skill 
                                                            
26 Online Appendix Figures A-8 and A-9 show the returns to skill estimates for each of the five disaggregated skill 
groups among men and women, respectively.  
27 To better understand the role of automation in explaining these results, we estimated the return to non-routine, 
cognitive skills and routine or manual skills separately for production and non-production workers (using the 
BLS/SOC code definitions of production occupations). These results are shown in Appendix Figure A-10 for men 
and A-11 for women. The results show that the skill returns within unions are not exclusively driven by the 





quartile jobs. The non-linearity is strongest in the unionized sector, where the returns to skill are 
almost entirely concentrated in the fourth quartile. These results suggest that changes in the 
return to skill have had different effects across different unionized professions. The gains from 
increasing return to non-routine, cognitive skills in the economy have flowed towards the higher-
skilled professions, even in the unionized sector. This has important implications for inequality 
that is a ripe area for future work.  
Estimates of the return to skill for women are presented in Figure 8. For both skill groups, 
unionized women experienced lower returns to skill than their non-union counterparts early in 
the sample. Beginning in the 1990s for routine/manual skills and in the early 2000s for non-
routine, cognitive skills, the returns converged across sectors. Currently, unionized and non-
unionized women experience a similar return to both skills. Figure 9 explores whether these 
returns to skill are linear with skill. As with men, the returns are highest for the fourth skill 
quartile, and the non-linearity is strongest among unionized workers.  
That unionized workers experience a substantial return to skill that has grown over time 
in both absolute terms and relative to the non-union sector is at odds with the predictions from 
prior models for how SBTC should affect unionization. Those models assert that unionization 
reduces the return to skill and leads high-skilled workers to opt out of unionization. Instead, the 
results are consistent with a model in which there are frictions in both unionization and de-
unionization as well as a shift in workers and occupations towards the non-unionized sectors. 
These shifts in workers and occupations are in turn being driven by SBTC, which alters the 
industrial mix of the economy. The unionization frictions are sufficient to keep these new 
occupations or the growing non-unionized jobs from unionizing at high rates, even though the 
financial return to doing so is high. It is the combination of SBTC and these unionization 
frictions that generate the patterns we show in the data.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper presents the first analysis of how the skills covered by unionized employment 
have changed over time and how these changes affect the union wage premium. We combine 
data from the CPS from 1973-2017 with occupation-specific task requirements from the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the Occupational Information Network. We first document 
that the skills covered by unionized workers have shifted towards more non-routine, cognitive 




women, though the shifts are larger for women than for men. Relative to non-union workers, we 
document an increased polarization of skills: union, non-union skill gaps decline for non-routine, 
cognitive skill, while relative skills gaps increase for routine or manual skills.  
We next decompose the changes in skill coverage we document into the part due to shifts 
in workers across occupations, the part due to within-occupation skill changes, and the part due 
to changes in the occupation mix itself. Changes to worker concentration across occupations 
combined with changes in occupation entry/exit are responsible for the majority of the changes 
in skills we document for men. For women, we additionally find some role for within-occupation 
changes in skill requirements. Finally, we show how accounting for these skill changes affect the 
estimated union skill premia. For both men and women, we first document a substantial decline 
of about 11 percentage points in the union wage premium since 1985. The bias from excluding 
skill measures is small; skill-inclusive premia are larger in the early part of the sample and then 
converge. The decline in the union wage premium is larger when we account for skills among 
men, while for women the decline is the same magnitude. We also present the first evidence in 
the literature that unions generate a high return to skill that has grown in absolute terms and 
relative to the non-union sector.   
We argue that increasing skill coverage among unionized jobs can be reconciled with 
SBTC using a simple Roy model that incorporates union flexibility in wage bargaining for 
different bargaining units as well as costs for both unionization and de-unionization. The model 
shows that changes to the return to skill driven by SBTC are unlikely to affect unionization rates 
as long as unions can negotiate wages that reflect the average skill level of workers in a 
bargaining unit. Our results are consistent with this assumption. Rather, SBTC shifts workers to 
previously non-unionized professions and creates new professions that are not unionized. The 
high cost of engaging in a unionization drive we argue is a likely reason why these new and 
growing professions do not unionize.  
Taken together, we show that skill-biased technological change has caused large shifts in 
the types of skills covered by unionized worker occupations. Over time, unionized employment 
has moved away from manual and routine jobs and towards more non-routine and cognitive 
occupations. These changes in private sector unions highlight that the reduction in overall private 
sector unionization has been accompanied by a change in the type of worker who is unionized. 




years ago because of the change in the skill composition of the workers covered. Additional 
work examining how these changes to private sector union coverage affect workers and the 
operation of higher-skilled labor markets can shed more light on the implications of these 
changes for both workers and employers.  
 
References 
[1] Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, and Giovanni  L. Violante. 2001. “Deunionization, 
Technical Change and Inequality.”  In Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 
55: 229–264. Elsevier. 
 
[2] Acemoglu, Daron and David Autor. 2011. “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for 
Employment and Earnings.” In Handbook of Labor Economics 4: 1043–1171. Elsevier. 
 
[3] Autor, David, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa Kearney. 2006. “Measuring and Interpreting 
Trends in Economic Inequality.” AEA Papers and Proceedings 96: 189–194. 
 
[4] Autor, David, Alan Manning, and Christopher L Smith. 2016. “The Contribution of the 
Minimum Wage to US Wage Inequality over Three Decades: A Reassessment.” American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8(1): 58–99. 
 
[5] Autor, David, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2008. “Trends in US Wage 
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 90(2): 300–323. 
 
[6] Autor, David, Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane. 2003. “The Skill Content of Recent 
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4): 
1279–1333. 
 
[7] Blanchflower, David G. and Alex Bryson. 2004. “What Effect do Unions Have on Wages 
Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?” Journal of Labor Research 25(3): 383–
414. 
 
[8] Card, David. 1996. “The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages:  A Longitudinal 
Analysis.” Econometrica 64(4): 957–979. 
 
[9] Card, David. 2001. “The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the US Labor Market.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54(2): 296–315. 
 
[10] Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell. 2020. “Unions and Wage Inequality: 
The Roles of Gender, Skill and Public Sector Employment.” Canadian Journal of Economics 
53(1): 140-173. 
 
[11] Deming, David J. 2017. “The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market.” 





[12] DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions 
and the Distribution  of  Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach.” Econometrica 64(5): 
1001-1044. 
 
[13] Farber, Henry S., Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko, and Suresh Naidu. 2018. “Unions and 
Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data.” NBER Working 
Paper No. 24587. 
 
[14] Farber, Henry S. and Bruce Western. 2001. “Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the 
Private Sector, 1973–1998.” Journal of Labor Research 22(3): 459–485. 
 
[15] Firpo, Sergio, Nicole Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 2016. “Decomposing Wage 
Distributions using Recentered Influence Function Regressions.” Econometrics 6(2): 28. 
 
[16] Fortin, Nicole and Thomas Lemieux. 2016. “Inequality and Changes in Task Prices: Within 
and Between Occupation Effects.”  In Inequality: Causes and Consequences; Research in Labor 
Economics, volume 43, pages 195–226. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
[17] Frandsen, Brigham R. 2016. “The Effects of Collective Bargaining Rights on Public 
Employee Compensation: Evidence from Teachers, Firefighters, and Police.” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 69(1): 84–112. 
 
[18] Freeman, Richard B. and James L. Medoff. 1984. “What Do Unions Do?” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 38(2): 244. 
 
[19] Hirsch, Barry T. and Edward J. Schumacher. 2004. “Match Bias in Wage Gap Estimates 
Due to Earnings Imputation.” Journal of Labor Economics 22(3): 689–722. 
 
[20] Kaplan, Greg and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl. 2012. “Interstate Migration has Fallen Less Than 
You Think: Consequences of Hot Deck Imputation in the Current Population Survey.” 
Demography 49(3): 1061–1074. 
 
[21] Kleiner, Morris M. 2001. “Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the Decline 
of Unionization in the Private Sector.” Journal of Labor Research 22(3): 519–540. 
 
[22] Lewis, H. Gregg. 1986. “Union Relative Wage Effects.” In Handbook of Labor Economics 
2: 1139–1181. 
 
[23] Ruggles, Steven, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas, and 
Matthew Sobek. IPUMS USA:  Version 9.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 10:D010, 
2019. 




Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Log Hourly Wage 3.06 0.43 2.81 0.65
Age 40.3 11.5 35.9 12.2
Years of Education 12.27 2.32 13.06 3.00
Non-Routine, Cognitive Skill -0.353 0.672 0.044 0.944
Routine or Manual Skill 0.427 0.886 -0.059 0.884
Non-Hispanic White(%) 74.4 70.9
Non-Hispanic Black(%) 10.8 8.4





Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Log Hourly Wage 2.81 0.51 2.59 0.60
Age 40.1 11.8 36.5 12.5
Years of Education 12.86 2.66 13.20 2.54
Non-Routine, Cognitive Skill -0.210 0.765 0.077 0.847
Routine or Manual Skill -0.022 0.794 -0.337 0.761
Non-Hispanic White(%) 65.9 73.5
Non-Hispanic Black(%) 16.7 10.3
Non-Hispanic Other(%) 5.7 4.9
Hispanic(%) 11.7 11.2
N 109,754 1,566,716
Authors’ tabulations as described in the text from the 1973-2017 CPS, the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DoT), and the Occupational Information
Network (O*NET).
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Table 2: Skills and Unionization Rates of Occupations Accounting for Largest Share of
Unionized Employment – Men
Occ. Share
of Union % Occ Non-Routine, Routine or
Employment in Union Cognitive Manual
1973
Machine operators, n.e.c. 8.85 57.77 -0.66 1.37
Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers 8.8 46.54 -0.88 -0.54
Heavy equipment and farm equipment mech 3.34 50.66 -0.44 1.16
Assemblers of electrical equipment 3.28 62.99 -0.97 0.40
Welders and metal cutters 2.88 63.69 -0.39 0.92
2017
Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers 8.24 11.70 -0.36 0.75
Electricians 4.86 31.01 0.10 1.36
Laborers outside construction 4 12.18 -0.99 0.36
Construction laborers 3.25 9.54 -0.89 0.86
Carpenters 3.14 16.09 0.10 1.31
The table shows the five occupations that account for the largest share of unionized employment (the Occ. Share of
Union Employment) in 1973 and 2017 among men. Occupations are ordered by their share of the overall unionized
worker population. All skill measures are in standard deviation units.
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Table 3: Skills and Unionization Rates of Occupations Accounting for Largest Share
of Unionized Employment – Women
Occ. Share
of Union % Occ Non-Routine, Routine or
Employment in Union Cognitive Manual
1973
Textile sewing machine operators 10.48 36.15 -1.03 1.77
Machine operators, n.e.c. 10.18 43.07 -0.66 1.37
Assemblers of electrical equipment 8.36 41.63 -0.97 0.40
Cashiers 6.90 25.94 -0.58 1.00
Packers, fillers, and wrappers 6.04 43.62 -1.07 -0.34
2017
Registered nurses 13.95 13.73 1.15 -0.25
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants 6.94 7.16 -0.13 -0.12
Primary school teachers 4.34 18.41 0.99 -1.43
Cashiers 4.05 4.21 -1.31 -1.02
Customer service reps, investigators 2.67 4.07 0.26 -1.32
and adjusters, except insurance
The table shows the five occupations that account for the largest share of unionized employment (the Occ. Share
of Union Employment) in 1973 and 2017 among women. Occupations are ordered by their share of the overall
unionized worker population. All skill measures are in standard deviation units.
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Table 4: Highest Unionization Rate Occupations Among the Top Quartile of Each Skill, 1973 and 2017
Panel A: Non-Routine, Cognitive
Unionization Unionization Unionization Unionization
Occupation 1973 Rate 1973 Rate 2017 Occupation 2017 Rate 1973 Rate 2017
Actors, directors, producers 1.00 0.13 Railroad conductors & yardmasters 0.89 0.71
Railroad conductors & yardmasters 0.89 0.71 Airplane pilots and navigators 0.42 0.53
Sociology instructors 0.49 Reclassified Primary school teachers 0.06 0.19
History instructors 0.36 Reclassified Secondary school teachers 0.11 0.19
Math instructors 0.37 Reclassified Supervisors of construction work Reclassified 0.16
Panel B: Routine or Manual
Unionization Unionization Unionization Unionization
Occupation 1973 Rate 1973 Rate 2017 Occupation 2017 Rate 1973 Rate 2017
Explosives workers 1.00 0.33 Locomotive operators 1.00 0.60
(engineers and firemen)
Millwrights 0.81 0.48 Locomotive operators 1.00 0.60
(engineers and firemen)
Structural Metal Workers 0.80 0.44 Elevator installers/repairers N/A 0.58
Telecom/Line Installers & Repairers 0.77 0.29 Millwrights 0.81 0.48
Lay-out Workers 0.75 N/A Structural metal workers 0.80 0.44
Patternmakers and Model Makers 0.74 0.74 Other plant & system operators Reclassified 0.38
Authors’ tabulations using the 1973 and 2017 CPS combined with 1977 and 1991 editions of the Dictionary of Occupation Titles (DOT) survey and
the 2004 and 2017 editions of the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) survey. “Rec” refers to an occupation that was reclassified between
1973 and 2017; “N/A” means there is no information on that occupation in that year.
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Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.422 -0.182
Change due to Worker Share 0.141 -0.203
[33.30%] [111.63%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.073 0.223
[17.31%] [-122.90%]





Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.830 -0.921
Change due to Worker Share 0.492 -0.219
[59.24%] [23.79%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.052 -0.368
[6.26%] [39.92%]
Change due to Occupation Entry/Exit 0.286 -0.334
[34.50%] [36.29%]
Authors’ estimation of equation (5) in the text. The sum of the three change
categories equals the total change by definition. The contribution of each category
to the overall change is shown, with the percent effect in brackets below. All skill
measures are in standard deviation units.
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Table 6: Union Wage Premium Estimates by Decade
Panel A: Men
Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions
Year (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1975 0.224*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.301*** 0.314*** 0.313***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.019) (.020) (0.019)
1985 0.301*** 0.354*** 0.354*** 0.360*** 0.383*** 0.382***
(0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
1995 0.228*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 0.307*** 0.305***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012)
2005 0.243*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.296*** 0.289*** 0.284***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014)
2015 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.271*** 0.265*** 0.259***
(0.035) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Occupation FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Women
Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions
Year (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1975 0.253*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.280*** 0.281*** 0.287***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
1985 0.292*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.317*** 0.321*** 0.325***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017)
1995 0.219*** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.238*** 0.250*** 0.253***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
2005 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.224*** 0.225***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.038) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
2015 0.219*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.217***
(0.049) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024)
Occupation FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with occupational
skill requirements in DOT and O*NET. Only results for selected years are shown: full estimates are presented in Figure
5. All estimates include controls for education, race, and age. Standard errors clustered at the occupation level are in
parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance
at the 10% level.
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Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure 2: Trends in Occupational Skill Requirements Among Unionized Occu-
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Routine or Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Non-Union - Women
Non-Routine, Cognitive Routine or Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure 4: Certification and Decertification Elections, 1962-2009
Source: Authors’ tabulations from National Labor Relations Board Data.
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Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Q2 Q3 Q4 Mean Skill Level (Right)
Returns to Cognitive Skills for Union Workers
By Quartile of Cognitive Skills
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Q2 Q3 Q4 Mean Skill Level (Right)
Returns to Cognitive Skills for Union Workers
By Quartile of Cognitive Skills
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Online Appendix: Not for Publication
Figure A-1: Trends in Occupational Skill Requirements by Union Status and
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Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure A-2: Trends in Occupational Skill Requirements by Union Status and
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Unionized Not Unionized Unionization Rate
Routine or Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure A-3: Bargaining Unit Size in Union Representation Elections, 1962-2009
Source: Authors’ tabulations from National Labor Relations Board Data.
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Unionized Not Unionized Unionization Rate
Non-Routine, Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure A-5: Trends in Occupational Skill Requirements Among Unionized Oc-











































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year











































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year











































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year











































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year











































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
High Task Rating Low Task Rating Unionization Rate - All Workers
Non-Routine, Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure A-6: Trends in Occupational Skill Requirements by Union Status and
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Year
Non-Union - Women
Non-Routine, Cognitive Analytical Non-Routine, Cognitive Interpersonal Routine, Cognitive
Routine, Manual Non-Routine, Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Non-Union Wage (Left) Union Wage (Left)
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Non-Routine, Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Non-Union Wage (Left) Union Wage (Left)
Nonunion -Skill Value (Right) Union -Skill Value (Right)
Non-Routine, Manual
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure A-10: Trends in the Return to Job Skills by Union Status, Production
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Year
Non-Production Production Mean Skill Level (Right)
Returns to Routine/Manual Skills for Non-Union Workers
By Production vs Non-Production Occupations
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Figure A-11: Trends in the Return to Job Skills by Union Status, Production
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Year
Non-Production Production Mean Skill Level (Right)
Returns to Routine/Manual Skills for Non-Union Workers
By Production vs Non-Production Occupations
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with
occupational skill requirements in DOT and O*NET.
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Table A-1: Specific Skills Used to Construct Occupational Skill Measures in DOT and
O*NET
Skill Type DOT Measure (1977, 1991) O*NET Equivalent(s) (2004, 2017)
Non-Routine, General educational Mathematics (ability)
Cognitive/Analytical development (GED) math
Non-Routine, Direction, control, planning Organizing, planning,
Cognitive/Interpersonal and prioritizing work
Routine, Cognitive Set limits, tolerance, Controlling machines and processes;
or standards Drafting, laying out, and specifying
technical devices, parts, and equipment;
Troubleshooting
Routine, Manual Finger dexterity Finger dexterity
Non-Routine, Manual Eye, hand, foot coordination Gross body equilibrium;
Spatial orientation
Non-Routine, Cognitive An additive combination of Non-Routine, Cognitive/Analytical
and Non-Routine, Cognitive/Interpersonal
Routine or Manual An additive combination of Routine, Cognitive; Routine, Manual;
and Non-Routine, Manual
60





Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.107 -0.117
Change due to Worker Share 0.040 -0.018
[37.16%] [15.55%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.003 -0.078
[3.15%] [66.97%]





Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.229 -0.255
Change due to Worker Share 0.126 0.011
[55.14%] [-4.46%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.005 -0.149
[2.02%] [58.55%]
Change due to Occupation Entry/Exit 0.098 -0.117
[42.84%] [45.91%]
Authors’ estimation of equation (5) in the text. The sum of the three change
categories equals the total change by definition. The contribution of each category
to the overall change is shown, with the percent effect in brackets below. All skill
measures are in standard deviation units.
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Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.315 -0.065
Change due to Worker Share 0.165 -0.191
[52.37%] [295.40%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.068 0.242
[21.58%] [-375.28%]





Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.600 -0.666
Change due to Worker Share 0.367 -0.191
[61.17%] [28.74%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.159 -0.425
[26.44%] [63.80%]
Change due to Occupation Entry/Exit 0.074 -0.050
[12.39%] [7.46%]
Authors’ estimation of equation (5) in the text. The sum of the three change
categories equals the total change by definition. The contribution of each category
to the overall change is shown, with the percent effect in brackets below. All skill
measures are in standard deviation units.
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Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.297 -0.257
Change due to Worker Share -0.019 -0.078
[-6.22%] [30.30%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.077 -0.013
[25.95%] [5.19%]





Change Category Cognitive or Manual
Total Change 0.618 -0.934
Change due to Worker Share 0.185 0.026
[29.91%] [-2.74%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.186 -0.803
[30.07%] [85.96%]
Change due to Occupation Entry/Exit 0.247 -0.157
[40.02%] [16.78%]
Authors’ estimation of equation (5) in the text. The sum of the three change
categories equals the total change by definition. The contribution of each category
to the overall change is shown, with the percent effect in brackets below. All skill
measures are in standard deviation units.
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Non-Routine Non-Routine Routine Routine Non-Routine
Change Category Cognitive Analytical Cognitive Interpersonal Manual Cognitive Manual
Total Change 0.211 0.323 0.087 -0.039 0.016
Change due to Worker Share 0.139 0.085 -0.144 -0.179 -0.149
[65.95%] [26.22%] [-166.32%] [462.69%] [-952.49%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills -0.042 0.055 0.343 0.292 0.227
[-20.01%] [17.16%] [395.67%] [-753.27%] [1455.44%]
Change due to Occupation Entry/Exit 0.114 0.183 -0.112 -0.151 -0.063
[54.07%] [56.62%] [-129.35%] [390.58%] [-402.95%]
Panel B: Women
Skill Type :
Non-Routine Non-Routine Routine Routine Non-Routine
Change Category Cognitive Analytical Cognitive Interpersonal Manual Cognitive Manual
Total Change 0.632 0.622 -0.657 -0.817 -0.171
Change due to Worker Share 0.274 0.509 -0.149 -0.249 -0.095
[43.37%] [81.75%] [22.64%] [30.53%] [55.64%]
Change due to Intra-Occ. Skills 0.158 -0.118 -0.254 -0.287 0.011
[24.94%] [-18.89%] [38.63%] [35.17%] [-6.23%]
Change due to Occupation Entry/Exit 0.200 0.231 -0.254 -0.280 -0.087
[31.69%] [37.14%] [38.73%] [34.30%] [50.59%]
Authors’ estimation of equation (5) in the text. The sum of the three change categories equals the total change by definition. The contribution of each
category to the overall change is shown, with the percent effect in brackets below. All skill measures are in standard deviation units.
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Table A-6: Union Wage Premium Estimates by Decade, Disaggregated Skill Measures
Panel A: Men
Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions
Year (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1975 0.224*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.301*** 0.313*** 0.317***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
1985 0.301*** 0.354*** 0.354*** 0.360*** 0.382*** 0.385***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
1995 0.228*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 0.307*** 0.308***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011)
2005 0.243*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.296*** 0.288*** 0.288***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015)
2015 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.271*** 0.264*** 0.263***
(0.035) (0.026) (0.0228) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Occupation FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Women
Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions Basic Model Skill Controls Skill Interactions
Year (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1975 0.253*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.28*** 0.299*** 0.302***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029)
1985 0.292*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.317*** 0.338*** 0.341***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.014)
1995 0.219*** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.238*** 0.266*** 0.268***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.0150) (0.016) (0.016)
2005 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.239*** 0.240***
(0.040) (0.031) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
2015 0.219*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.231*** 0.232***
(0.049) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Occupation FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 1973-2017 CPS data combined with occupational
skill requirements in DOT and O*NET. Only results for selected years are shown: full estimates are presented in Figure
5. All estimates include controls for education, race, and age. Standard errors clustered at the occupation level are in
parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance
at the 10% level.
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